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- The topic "Berlin" was a priority item at the conference of Land Delegates for Berlin which was held on 27-29 June. In addition to the published speeches by Pieck, Grotewohl, and Jendretzky, several other speakers gave their views on this priority topic. A "self-critical" address, which Professor Havermann, head of the Berlin Peace Committee, had prepared, was suppressed by Ulbricht shortly before the speech was to be delivered. Havermann had intended to delineate the means by which Berlin could be drawn into the Soviet sphere of influence. Havermann's address, however, was to have been a repetition of the old arguments which favored influencing socialist, neutralist, and other elements. His argumentation was based entirely on the fact that he had considered the signing of the contractual agreements to be an act which would put an end to the Potsdam treaty and the Four-Power agreements.
- Ulbricht later informed a select number of delegates at a top-secret meeting that these arguments could not be used. Ulbricht stated that the Russians had expected that Berlin would be included in the contractual agreements. This would have invalidated the Four-Power agreements automatically. As a result the Western Allies would have forfeited their right to be in Berlin. Berlin, however, was not included. This was not done for the sake of the West Berliners, Ulbricht stated, but because the Americans were determined to remain in Berlin. Russian efforts are directed toward making the stay of the Western Allies increasingly impossible, but the contractals have not proved to be the means of driving them out of Berlin at this time. Ulbricht stated further that any reference made to the effect that the Western Allies' stay in Berlin would be a short one would merely serve to strengthen the position of the West.
- Ulbricht stated that Russian tactics in Berlin mirrored Russian world strategy. This should not prevent the SED from concentrating its efforts on winning over West Berlin for the East from within. The SED has had the least success in the furtherance of its policies in Berlin. The SED has not been able to make any headway in West Berlin with the trade unions, the SPD, or the bourgeois "peace groups". The many situations which could be exploited, such as unemployment, have hardly been touched. Ulbricht charged that the Berlin party organization had not understood how to adapt East Berlin propaganda tactics for the purpose

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of influencing East Berlin. The Russians, he stated, had made East Berlin the international show window for the Eastern world. They had sent their most qualified politicians, scientists, artists and activists to East Berlin, but the Berlin SED organization has not been able to exploit these representational tactics in East Berlin. Although the SED opposes the German peace contract, the German plan, and other policies of the Federal Republic, the Berlin SED has not succeeded in penetrating the FRG. Although the Berlin trade unions have been on strike, the Berlin SED has not been able to penetrate the GDR.

4. Ulbricht stated further that the Berlin SED party organization was incapable of developing 'revolutionary activism'. It had been unable to coordinate its functions as the state party in East Berlin with those of a revolutionary cadre in West Berlin. The Berlin SED had expected the Berlin problem would be liquidated by overt Russian action and had thus failed to carry out its revolutionary assignment.
5. Ulbricht indicated that blockade measures against East Berlin would not be relaxed in the near future but instead would be augmented. This would increase the responsibility of the Berlin SED party organization for exploiting all possible means in order to establish their 'influence' in East Berlin. The main task of the party organization will be to prevent East Berlin from continuing to be a transit point for Western spies and propaganda entering the GDR.
6. Hans Jendretzky, 1st Secretary of the SED, Berlin, has been named special instructor for security in Berlin by the Minister of State Security, Wilhelm Zaisser.

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